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Goodman fl. Lukens Steel Co.:
PERSONAL INJURY STATUTE OF
UMlTATIONS NOW APPLIED TO
TInE VII ClAIMS BROUGHT IN
PENNSYLVANIA
In Goodman fl. Lukens Steel Co.,
_U.S---. 107 S. Ct. 2617 (1987), the
United States Supreme Court ruled that
the Pennsylvania personal injury statute of
limitations should be applied to all claims
in that state arising under Tide vn of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court further
ruled that the personal injury two year
statute of limitations should be applied
retroactively to all prior cases where there
was no clear precedent to guide the parties
to the suit.
In the case at bar, black employees of a
Pennsylvania steel company brought a
class action suit against their employer,
Lukens Steel, and their collective
bargaining agents, the United Steelworkers
of America, and two of their local unions.
The employees alleged violations of both
Tide vn of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and 42 U.S.c. S 1981. The district court
ruled that the steel company had violated
Tide vn by discharging employees during
their probationary period, tolerating racial
harassment by employees, and using
certain proscribed practices involving
initial job assignments, promotions, and
decisions on incentive pay. By these same
actions the district court also found that
the company had violated 42 U.S.c.
S1981. Similarly, the court found that the
unions also violated both statutes by
discriminating on racial grounds in failing
to challenge discriminatory discharges of
probationary employees, failure and
refusal to assert racial discrimination as a
ground for grievances, and toleration and
tacit encouragement of racial harassment.
In assessing damages, the court ruled that
the Pennsylvania six year statute of
limitations governing contract claims
applied to S 1981 claims. Thus, in
determining damages, the court would
consider all violations that occurred in the
six year period prior to the institution of
suit. Lukens Steel appealed on the grounds
that the district court applied the wrong
statute of limitations, and the unions based
their appeal on a claim that Tide vn and
S 1981 were erroneously applied.
The Supreme Court agreed that the six
year statute of limitations was not the
correct statute to apply. Relying on Wilson
fl. Garda, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), the Court
held that since S 1981 does not contain a
statute of limitations, federal courts should
select the most appropriate or analogous
state statute of limitations. The district
court held that the most analogous statute

was the one applicable to suits for
interference with contractual rights, a six
year statutue of limitations. Lukens Steel
argued, and the Supreme Court agreed,
that S 1981 has a much broader focus than
contractual rights, because U[t]he section
speaks not only of personal rights to
contract, but personal rights to sue, to
testify, and to equal rights under all laws
for the security of persons and property;
and all persons are to be subject to like
punishments, taxes and burdens of every
kind." Goodman, 107 S. Ct. at 2621. Thus,
S 1981 is part of a law which considers
racial discrimination an injury to the
fundamental rights of an individual, and
the proper statute of limitations to apply is
the Pennsylvania two year statute of
limitations that governs personal injury
claims.
The plaintiff argued that the statute
should not be retroactively applied
because prior Third Circuit decisions held
that the proper statute was six years.
However, the Court felt that retroactivity
was appropriate in this case because at the
time of the filing of this suit, 1973, "there
had been no authoritative specification of
which statute of limitations applied to an
employee's S 1981 claims, and hence no
clear precedent on which petitioner could
have relied when they filed their
complaint in this case." Id. at 2622. It was
not until 1977, in Myers fl. Pennypack

Woods Home Ownership Association, 559
F.2d 894 (1977), that the Third Circuit
adopted the six year statute of limitations.
The Court also refused to overturn the
lower court's finding that the unions
illegally discriminated against
the
plaintiffs. Although the unions claim that
the trial court erred in holding that the
union violated Tide vn and S 1981 by
passively not opposing an employer's
racially discriminatory employment
practices, the Court did not address this
argument. Rather, it cited the lower court
fmding that there was more than mere
passivity on the part of the unions, and
announced that there is an affirmative
duty on the part of the unions to challenge
the employer when instances of alleged
racial discrimination arise. Based on this
decision and the fact that there was more
than just mere acquiescence on the part of
the unions, the Court rejected the unions'
appeal.
The Supreme Court's fmding in this case
is significant because the statute of
limitations governing personal injury
claims in Pennsylvania has been reduced
from six years to two and the Court has
announced that it should be applied
retroactively in cases filed before a clear
precedent existed to guide the parties. In

addition, the Court has also restated that
unions have an affirmative duty to
challenge discriminatory practices by
employers whenever they arise.
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Mothers Against Drunk Driving

RIGHT ON SCHEDULE!
Maryland
Drunk-Driving Fatalities:
1982..... 336 1985.. ... 370
1983..... 358 ~~~!!!!!!!!
1984..... 331 1986..... 356
Is this to be socially accepted MURDER?
With this continuing carnage, plus having over
10,000 personal injuries per year all due to drunkdriving, Maryland will never be America's best-

• UNLESS, Maryland's Drunk-Driving Laws
are equal or better than most of the other
49 states. They are not now.
• UNLESS, Maryland's Judiciary, as a group,
can find the courage to issue drunk-driving
sentences which get the drunk off the road.
They do not now.
• UNLESS. Maryland's Vehicle Licensing Administration gets tough on revocation and suspension of drivers' licenses. They are not now.
• UNLESS. Maryland's Executive Branch funds
detention and rehabilitation centers to incarcerate and rehabilitate the drunk driver, especially
the repeat offender. They do not now.

MADD NEEDS YOUR HELP!
CALL NOW
321-MADD
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